We introduce Adversarial Method of Moments (AMM), for models defined with moment conditions. The estimator is asymptotically equivalent to optimallyweighted 2–step GMM, but outperforms the GMM estimator in finite samples. We show this both in theory and in simulations. In our theoretical results, we exploit the relationship between AMM and GEL estimators to show, using stochastic expansions, that AMM has smaller bias than optimally–weighted GMM. In our simulation experiments, we consider different models, including estimation of variance as in Altonji and Segal (1996) and a dynamic panel data model. We compare the estimator’s performance to other commonly–used procedures in the literature, and find that AMM outperforms in cases where other estimators fail. We also extend AMM to simulation–based settings, and consider 2 applications, DSGE models by matching IRF, and consumption-income processes as in Blundell, Pistaferri & Preston (2008).

I study the role of labor market frictions in production network economies for the transmission of shocks. I argue that the specific demand for skill bundles, represented by the intersectoral job–to–job (J2J) transitions, is crucial to understand this transmission. To this end, I set up a model where firms on each sector demand a certain bundle of skills, and workers specialize as long as they are working. After a shock, workers with suitable skills will find it profitable to move to to certain industries on impact. However, the shock propagates over the production network over time, and the cumulative effect on the sectoral employment distribution differs substantially. I find that both sector–specific labor markets and the network structure play a role in increasing unemployment volatility.

Conditional cash transfers have become a popular tool the government employs to enhance the living conditions of the poor and vulnerable citizens in Latin America. Using the synthetic counterfactual method, we study the e¤ect of these plans on education in three different countries (Argentina, Ecuador and Colombia). We find that in Argentina, the effect of AUH for the three consecutive years after its implementation is positive and increasing in time. This result is validated using two inference techniques, difference-in-differences and placebo test. In the case of Ecuador, the method does not provide a suitable control unit, therefore the effect of BDH remains unacknowledged. Finally, for Colombia we also identify positive and increasing effects starting three years after FA was implemented. This could be explained as a result of the 2003 reform that FA went through.